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Joining the Dots: External Norms, AFSJ Directives and the EU’s Role in Global 
Legal Order 
 
Forthcoming in the European Law Review 
 
Dr. Elaine Fahey 
 
Abstract 
 
This article considers how external norms, i.e. instruments of public international law, including 
but not limited to Conventions, agreements and treaties qua norms ‘internalise’ into 17 proposed 
and adopted Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) Directives of the last legislative cycle 
of the EU, from 2009-2014. The article considers select Directives, namely (i) the first EU criminal 
law directive, (ii) the first AFSJ directive struck down by the Court, (iii) a Directive employing a 
norm common to internal and external rule-making, (iv) UN Conventions in AFSJ Directives and 
(v) Directives omitting the promotion of any external norms. The study of the promotion of 
external norms is argued to reveal much about the relationship between the ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ of EU law and policy and the evolution of its AFSJ. The EU’s participation in these 
external norms is also relevant for the study of the EU’s role in the world. 
 
 
Introduction  
While the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) is now a fully regularised area of EU 
law post-Lisbon,1 its subject area is a complex one because it spans many diverse areas close 
to Member State sovereignty, for example, criminal and migration law. It also now comprises 
highly diverse areas where the European Union wishes to autonomously set and lead policy at 
an international level.2 Precisely where its norms emanate from and how the European Union 
develops its own norms here are of significance in understanding its evolution. Certain former 
Third Pillar law took external norms as its inspiration.3 Nowadays the European Union wants to 
join many international organisations or to lead as an organisation in the international context.4 
It thus forms a very different climate for the use of external norms in the AFSJ. External norms 
are deployed in most of the 17 AFSJ Directives of the last legislative cycle of the EU, from 2009-
2014. The relationship between external norms, European Union legislative practice and the EU 
in the world is argued to be far from transparent or explicit in EU law itself and is thus worthy of 
development.  Accordingly, this article considers how external norms, i.e. understood 
predominantly as instruments of public international law, including but not limited to Conventions, 
                                               
 Senior Lecturer, City Law School, City University London. Email: Elaine.fahey.1@city.ac.uk.  
Thanks to participants at the ECPR joint research sessions in Salamanca 2014 and the EUSA AFSJ stream in Boston 2015 and Prof. Marie-Pierre 
Granger for their comments and remarks. I am grateful to Raluca Sterian for her research assistance provided and the reviewer and editors for 
their helpful comments. 
1 The general regime of legal acts mentioned in arts. 288-294 TFEU applies to measures adopted in the AFSJ. See the regularisation of the AFSJ 
in Title IV TFEU of the Consolidated Treaties of the European Union. See R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) pp. 309 onwards. 
2 E.g. See S. Blockmans, B. van Vooren and J. Wouters (eds), The Legal Dimension of Global Governance: What Role for the EU? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); R. Wessel, L. Marin, and C. Matera, “The external dimension of the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice” in C. 
Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds) Crime within the area of freedom security and justice—a European Public Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 272, 272-278. 
3 For example, Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA amending the 2002 Framework Decision on combating terrorism [2008] OJ L330/21, which 
copies verbatim the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005, CETS No.196: see V. Mitseligas “The third wave of 
third pillar law: which direction for EU criminal justice?” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 523, 525.  
4 In line with Article 21 TFEU: see Communication to the Commission from the President in Agreement with Vice-President Ashton: Strategy for 
the progressive improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
COM(2012) 9420 final. See, for a perspective prior to the changes in the Treaty of Lisbon, M. Cremona, “The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, 
Models and Identity” (2004) 41 C.M.L.R 553.  
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agreements and treaties qua norms ‘internalise’ into 17 proposed and adopted AFSJ Directives. 
It also explores the links between internal rule-making practices with the EU’s external action. 
As the object of scrutiny, the promotion of external norms in AFSJ rule-making reveals much 
about the relationship between the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ of EU law and policy and the evolution 
of AFSJ rule-making. 5 As a secondary objective, the study of norm promotion is also argued 
here to be shown to be relevant for the study of the EU’s role in the world, looking outwards-in, 
through the examination of the EU’s participation in those same external norms. This study is 
argued to bring transparency to the nexus between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ in the AFSJ. 
 
The most usual or dominant form of norm promotion that is evident in the Directives is the 
assertion of their compatibility with an internal legal source, most usually the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Charter hereafter).6 In the 17 Directives examined here, external norms 
also played a role in 15 Directives where they are invoked to justify, explain and support new 
rule-making. The external norms referred to include the General agreement on trade in services 
(GATT), Economic Partnership Agreement with the Cariforum countries, UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Second Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography, Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure, United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, ILO 
Convention concerning forced or compulsory labour, Convention relating to the status of 
refugees/  Geneva Convention 1951, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional 
Protocol, Council of Europe Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation 
and sexual abuse, the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and the Vienna Convention on Road 
Traffic, UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime and the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime.7 The vast 
majority form instruments where the EU is not a party but where most but not necessarily all the 
Member States are. 
 
The AFSJ Directives of the legislative cycle examined here can be collected into five distinct 
themes- namely, accused and victims’ rights, fighting serious crime /terrorism, third country 
nationals/ asylum and immigration and other crime-related fields. Matters related to third country 
nationals comprise the most numerous of these proposals,8 whilst the accused and victims’ rights 
                                               
5 The legal dimension to which has been asserted to be understudied: F. Trauner and H. Carrapiço, “The External Dimension of European Union 
Justice and Home Affairs after the Lisbon Treaty: Analysing the Dynamics of Expansion and Diversification” (2012) 17 Eur. For. Aff. Rev. 1. See 
also E. Fahey and E. Herlin-Karnell, “Special issue: EU law qua Global Governance” (2012) 13 G.L.J. 1147 and contributions therein. 
6 I.e. it is on the same level as the treaties and is legally binding: see art.  6(1) TEU. See Kucukdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co (C-555/07) [2010] 
E.C.R. I-00365.  
7 For further references and the specific role of the European Union and its Member States in the membership of these norms is considered in 
Section I(i). 
8 This includes: Directive 2014/36  on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment 
[2014] OJ L 94/375;  Proposal for a Directive on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-
corporate transfer  2010/0209 (COD); Directive 2011/98  on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to 
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agenda forms a close second thereto.9  This account proposes to consider the output of these 
AFSJ Directives through Finnemore and Sikkink’s formula of the ‘life of norms’ in order to gain 
insights as to the journey taken by external norms in recent rule-making practice. It is now a 
means or formula increasingly used by legal scholars studying rule-making practices beyond the 
Nation State.10 As to the specific stages of the life of norms, Stage 1, so-called norm emergence, 
results from ‘persuasion’ by a ‘norm entrepreneur’ or generator, whereby a critical mass of what 
are termed as ‘norm leaders’ embrace new norms. Stage 2 involves specific actions in the form 
of ‘norm cascades’ predominantly through what is termed as ‘socialisation’, for reasons of 
legitimacy, conformity and esteem. Stage 3 involves their internalisation, whereby actors 
specifically conform to those norms and processes through further adoption. In each of these 
stages, this framework is conducted through law in all of its stages as distinct processes of 
change an evolution.  As a result, the ‘life of norms’ arguably offers an attractive analytical 
framework for those seeking to study methodologies for understanding rule-making. This 
account specifically focuses upon Stage 2 and the process of ‘socialisation’ of external norms 
internally within the in the AFSJ.11 It thus considers the concept of socialisation and how it applies 
to external norms in AFSJ rule-making in two ways. It considers two specific questions, as 
follows. Firstly, what is the place of the European Union and the Member States in a specific 
external norm (what norms)? Secondly, how should we assess its impact within the EU legislative 
process (what they actually mean)? The paper thus considers both the ‘inwards’ and ‘outwards’ 
meaning of the use of external norms in AFSJ rule-making practice. 
 
The account here focusses upon the recitals of 17 AFSJ Directives of the 2009-2014 legislative 
cycle, so as to understand transparency, origins and influences upon rule-making. It focusses 
also upon the broader objectives and context in EU law and policy of the Directives. Directives 
in the AFSJ provide room for manoeuvre for the Member States in this field. They often bear 
heavily upon sovereignty, especially in implementation.12 Conventionally, a Directive is 
understood as being more suited for having a coordinating rather than a consolidating role as a 
                                               
reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State 
[2011] OJ L343/1; Directive 2011/95 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted [2011] OJ L337/9; Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated and unremunerated training, voluntary service and au pairing COM(2013) 151 final; Directive 
2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [2013] OJ L180/60; Directive 2013/33 laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection [2013] OJ L180/96.  
9 This includes: Directive 2010/64 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L280/1, Directive 2012/29 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA [2012] OJ L 315/57; Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L142/1; Directive 2011/99 
on the European protection order [2011] OJ L338/2.  A Regulation in the Road Map legislative is omitted in this account which only considers 
Directives: i.e. Regulation (European Union) No 606/2013 on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters [2013] OJ  L 181/4.  
10 “Norm promotion” as a search term appears in approx. 600 hits in Westlaw International, “world legal journals” search (last accessed May 1, 
2015). See J. Ellis, “Shades of grey: soft law and the validity of public international law” (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 313; at 
note 5 : “Finnemore and Sikkink do not focus on legal norms; nevertheless, their discussion of the life cycle of international norms, at 895 ff., is 
highly illuminating for discussions of the emergence of international legal norms”. 
11 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52 International Organisation 887, 893; M. 
Finnemore “Norms, Culture and world politics: insights from sociology’s institutionalism” (1996) 50 International Organisation 325. 
12 See art.  67(1), 69 and 72 TFEU for highly variable expressions of Member State autonomy and competence vis a vis AFSJ rule-making. See P. 
Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 372. 
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regulatory instrument.13 However, a feature of contemporary AFSJ rule-making is that a Directive 
may as a single instrument unite a broad range of substantive and procedural issues for the 
AFSJ in ways not previously possible. It may still also permit, at least theoretically, Member State 
autonomy, e.g., through implementation or enforcement.14 AFSJ Directives may thus have a 
‘norm unifying’ effect if it can incorporate a patchwork of existing instruments.15 The meaning of 
cascading and ‘internalisation’ of norms is a specific one in the case of Directives in the AFSJ 
because of the sensitivities of enforcement and compliance in this field.16 Thus, the exercise of 
tracing rule-making and disentangling the life of norms within this process can also improve our 
understanding of norm interaction in EU law. ‘Bottom up’ research on implementation in the 
AFSJ in the Member States is thus beyond the scope of the present work. By examining 
Directives, the account here is a nevertheless a distinctive one for understanding AFSJ rule-
making ‘top down’. 
 
Section I outlines the participation of the European Union and the Member States in specific 
external norms used in AFSJ directives and frames the issues arising for the study of this 
participation. Section II considers the EU’s goal as to specific external norms in select Directives, 
including (i) the first European Union criminal law directive, (ii) the first AFSJ directive struck 
down by the Court of Justice, (iii) a Directive centrally employing a norm common to EU internal 
and external AFSJ rule-making, (iv) the use of UN Conventions in AFSJ Directives and (v) AFSJ 
Directives omitting the promotion of any external norms. This is followed in Section III by analysis 
of the practices of external norm promotion. 
 
The participation of the European Union and the Member States in specific external 
norms 
(i) Overview 
The second stage of the theorisation of the life of norms, ‘norm cascade’ involves the broader 
process of the ‘socialisation’ or actual acceptance of a norm into, for example, a legal order. 
There is no single or agreed definition of socialisation across disciplines save that it is a key 
concept to understand how states and non-state actors change their behaviour and embrace 
new ideas.17 At its broadest definition, it is a process of learning.18 It encompasses a process of 
change e.g. changing beliefs at sub-national level, demands for political change and 
institutionalisation.19 For some, socialisation is an outcome of changing beliefs whereas for 
others socialisation leads to a change in behaviour.20 Socialisation is defined by some as a 
                                               
13See A. Hinerajos, Judicial Control in the European Union Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillars (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) p. 51. 
14 Art.  67 TFEU, for example, emphasises respect for the differing legal systems and traditions of the Member States. 
15 E.g. the European Investigative Order (Directive 2014/41) on the transfer of evidence between Member States purports to unify the rules 
drawn from a Council of Europe convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters and two protocols, the European Union Convention on 
Mutual Assistance, the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the Framework Decision on the execution of orders and freezing 
of property or evidence [2014] OJ L130/1. See Section II, iv. 
16 For example, it may relate more to enforcement and compliance rather than standard-setting. 
17 Finnemore, above, fn.11. 
18 Finnemore and Kikkink above, fn.11; K. Waltz The Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley Publications, 1979). 
19 S. Park, “Socialisation and the liberal order” (2014) International Politics 334. 
20 Above fn. 19, 339. 
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process of inducing actors into the norms and rule to a given society,21 or a process through 
which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting.22 
The integration of norms as socialisation may thus be theoretical, institutional or operational. As 
Koops states, socialisation is integral to understanding the Europeanisation of Member State 
policies.23 Member States become exposed to common norms, procedures and a way of doing 
things, whereby they incorporate them. When others are persuaded to support normative change 
and there is an inducement to adhere to a norm then a norm cascade occurs. Europeanisation 
of Member State policy is not the only means to consider socialisation. 
 It is argued that socialisation helps to explain change at EU level in the development of the 
autonomy of its legal order with its own norms.  It is thus argued here to have specific relevance 
in the supranational legal context. Where a complex field of law-making is evolving, with both 
internal and external dimensions, as in the case of the AFSJ, there are significant shifts in norms, 
procedures and a way of doing things. How ‘apart’ or separate external norms are or how 
integrated they are, formally or informally or how institutionalised they are in this context may 
vary considerably and may impact significantly upon the evolution of EU law. The processes, 
changes and inducements required for ‘change’ are arguably more complex and multilevel in the 
evolving AFSJ, as a context of EU law which warrants further and more particularised study 
through a prism such as socialisation. 
 
The practice of the European Union and the Member States as to external norms, i.e. their 
participation therein is considered next, framing the issues arising from this participation so as 
to understand socialisation with respect to AFSJ Directives.  
 
(i) European Union and Member State Participation in External Norms in the 2009-
2014 AFSJ Legislative Cycle 
The instruments promoted in the 17 Directives considered here include two specific ‘internal’ 
norms and the remainder are analysed here as ‘external’ norms: thus the Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in criminal matters between the Member States of the European Union is an 
European Union specific instruments and are thus classifiable as an ‘internal’ instrument.24 The 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms may 
arguably be classified similarly also.25 ‘External’ norms found in AFSJ Directives mostly have a 
                                               
21 See J. Checkel “International institutions and socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework” (2005) 59 International Organisation 801, 
804. See also J. Checkel (ed), International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
22 See A. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Others criticise 
socialisation literature for its unidirectional focus, which makes it hard to explain new patterns of behaviour as to emerging powers: see P. 
Xiaoyu, “Socialisation as Two-way Process: Emerging powers and the diffusion of international norms” (2012) Chinese Journal of international 
Politics 341. 
23 J. Koops, The European Union as an Integrative Power: Assessing the European Union’s Effective Multilateralism towards NATO and the United 
Nations (Brussels: VU Press, 2011), p. 215. 
2428 parties, all European Union Member States (MS):  Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on 
European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union 2000/C 197/01. 
25 The governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe,  28 European Union Member States (MS), 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm [Accessed August 17, 2015]. As amended by the Lisbon Treaty, art. 6(2) TEU 
provides that the European Union “shall accede” to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. See Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to 
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much broader membership than EU Member states in all but two instances.26 These norms 
include the European Social Charter of 1961,27 General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATT),28 Economic Partnership Agreement with the Cariforum countries of 2008,29 the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,30 First Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children 
in Armed Conflict,31 Second Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography,32 Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure,33  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,34 UN 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,35 ILO Convention concerning 
forced or compulsory labour,36 Convention relating to the status of refugees (Geneva 
Convention),37 Council of Europe Convention on the protection of children against sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse,38 the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women,39 the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention,40 the Vienna 
Convention on Road Traffic, 41 the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime42 and 
the Council of Europe Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime and on the financing of terrorism.43 The Economic Partnership Agreement 
with the Cariforum countries and Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on a communications procedure are the external norms used which have the smallest 
membership and demonstrate preference for the use of broadly accepted norms. The vast 
                                               
the ECHR, December 28, 2014, confirming its place as an external norm. However, its place as part of the general principles of EU law for some 
time and its relationship to the Charter of Fundamental Rights suggest that it is a de facto internal norm.  
26 I.e. the Economic Partnership Agreement with the Cariforum countries and Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on a communications procedure: see below further in the following footnotes for references. 
27 47 parties, 28 European Union MS are parties: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp 
[Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
28 159 members, all 28 European Union MS members , European Union a member, All members of the WTO are signatories to the GATS 1869 
UNTS 183; 33 ILM 1167 (1994); https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm [Accessed August 17, 2015].  
29 43 parties, 27 European Union MS except Croatia, European Union a member 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?redirect=true&treatyId=7407 [Accessed 
August 17, 2015]. 
30UN General Assembly, November 20, 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3. 194 Parties, all European Union MS are parties: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&article=4&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
31UN General Assembly, May 25, 2000. 155 parties, all European Union MS are parties 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-b&article=4&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
32UN General Assembly, March 16, 2001. 167 parties, all European Union MS are parties 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&article=4&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015].  
33 UN General Assembly, December 17, 2011. 17 parties, 6 European Union MS are parties 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-11-d&article=4&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
34 UN General Assembly, January 24, 2007. 147 parties, all European Union MS are parties, European Union has signed and ratified it 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=iv-15&article=4&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
35UN General Assembly, November 15, 2000. 159 parties, 27 European Union MS are parties, except Czech Republic, European Community has 
signed and ratified it https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&article=18&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
36No. 29, 39 UNTS 55. 177 parties, all European Union MS are parties 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312174 [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
37July 28,  1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 145 parties, all European Union MS are parties 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&article=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en#Participants 
[Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
38  July 12, 2007, CETS No. 201. 31 parties, 18 European Union MS are parties: 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=201&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
39 December 18, 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13. 188 parties, all European Union MS are parties: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&article=4&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
40November 23, 2001, CETS No. 185. 66 parties, 28 European Union MS 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
41 UN General Assembly, November 8, 1968. 73 parties, 23 European Union MS are parties: 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/conventn/CP_Vienna_convention.pdf. Its membership is broader that the Geneva Convention on 
Road Traffic of 1949 (96 parties, 22 MS) [Accessed August 17, 2015].  
42 UN General Assembly, January 8, 2001, A/RES/55/25. 185 parties, European Union is a signatory, 26 MS are parties 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xviii-12&chapter=18&lang=en [Accessed August 17, 2015].  
43 May 15, 2005, CETS No. 198. 28 European Union MS are parties; European Union is a signatory: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=198&CM=8&DF=11/10/2013&CL=ENG [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
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majority of external norms in AFSJ directives involve all Member States as parties. Contrariwise, 
the European Union is not a party itself to most of the instruments used. A small number of the 
agreements, treaties or conventions used by the European Union in AFSJ Directives have not 
been ratified by all of the Member States themselves.44   
The next step is then to frame legal issues arising from these statuses that are relevant for 
understanding socialisation and internal rule-making practice. 
 
(ii) Understanding socialisation in the AFSJ legislation process  
Three distinct issues are argued to arise from these statuses as a means to understand 
socialisation warranting consideration here, broadly conceived as time, space and place. 
Specifically, these include the place of participation, the robustness of external norms and the 
temporal context. Thus firstly, there is a body of scholarship in non-legal scholarship on the 
coherence of EU and Member State voices participating in international organisations and their 
influence.45 Legal scholars tend to focus more upon either the legal framework for participation 
itself or the internal impact in European Union and Member State caselaw of external norms.46 
This account thus bridges these perspectives and considers the place of participation and the 
influence of norm promotion in the context of the AFSJ. Secondly, non-legal scholars specifically 
argue that EU law frequently reaches for external norms because of their asserted “robustness,” 
rather than participation issues.47 While robustness is clearly relevant here as a criterion, from a 
legal perspective how much external norms change, institutionalise or evolve rule-making 
practice arguably requires more nuanced and holistic reflection. Whether external norms have a 
pivotal impact as legal tools is thus considered here also, where the flexibility and malleability of 
external norms is assessed. Thirdly, certain external norms such as specific UN Conventions 
may have a historic influence upon both primary EU law as well as more recently upon secondary 
EU law (i.e. AFSJ Directives). Can we distinguish short-term and longer-term European Union 
and Member State participation in external norms in AFSJ directives? This account thus 
considers whether temporal contexts matter in a broader sense, so as to reflect on socialisation 
as a process.  
 
Section II next considers these specific themes (participation, robustness and temporal 
questions) as to the promotion of external norms in five select genres of AFSJ directives. The 
Directives selected reflect a range of instances by considering significant new practices and/ or 
                                               
44 E.g. the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic.  
45 E.g. K. Smith ''The European Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with One Voice but Having Little Influence” (2010) 17(2) Journal 
of European Public Policy, 224; O. Costa and K. Jørgensen (eds) The Influence of International Institutions on the EU (London: Palgrave, 2012). 
46 E.g. R. Wessel “The Legal Framework for the Participation of the European Union in International Institutions” (2011) 33(6) European 
Integration 621. 
47 See C. Roos and N. Zaun, “Norms Matter! The Role of International Norms in European Union Policies on Asylum and Immigration” (2014) 16 
Eur.J. Mig. Law. 45, 61-62. In order to measure the impact of international norms, they have argued that their robustness can be measured, as 
to their specific, definition, binding force, coherence under domestic law and international law and understanding among actors. However, to 
measure such impact from a legal perspective would arguable amount to a much larger study of domestic case-law, legislation and policy beyond 
the scope of the exercise conducted here, which is confined to a small sample of directives. 
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acts of both the EU legislature and the EU judiciary in the AFSJ: for example, (i) the first EU 
criminal law directive and (ii) the first AFSJ directive struck down by the Court. Next, the sample 
considered concern Directives which provide explicit evidence of the link between internal and 
external rule-making practices across the AFSJ: (iii) a Directive employing a norm common to 
internal and external rule-making. They further include Directives where external norms have 
‘primacy’ as a norm in the Directive and conversely they include Directives where there is only 
minimalist reference or ‘weak’ usage of external norms: (iv) UN Conventions in AFSJ Directives. 
The selection finally includes Directives without any indicators or references to any norms 
whatsoever: (v) AFSJ Directives omitting the promotion of any external norms. 
 
Section II: External Norms in Select AFSJ Directives 
(i) The First EU Criminal law Directive 
The first and earliest European Union directive in the area of Criminal law enacted post-Lisbon 
was the Trafficking Directive (Directive 2011/36), which drew from seven external norms (UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, especially Women and Children and the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings, the Geneva Convention, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning forced or compulsory labour, the UN Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime and the  Council of Europe Convention on the Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime) and one internal norm, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.48 Although a purely numerical calculation, this numerical formulation 
tends to be excess of most subsequent directives. 
 
The first international definition of trafficking in human beings was agreed in the 2000 UN 
Protocol to Prevent, Supress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children 
(the Palermo Protocol).49 The Palermo Protocol is said to serve as a broad model in a variety of 
contexts.50 The European Union has previously adopted the values of the UN Palermo Protocol 
within its treaties and the European Community had signed and ratified it, as have 27 Member 
States.51 The EU approach to the trafficking in human beings has explicitly sought to differentiate 
itself as ‘holistic’, ‘multifaceted’ and even multidisciplinary.52  However, the European Union was 
previously perceived as favouring the limitation of irregular migration and not ameliorating the 
situation of the trafficked. Nonetheless, at both international and European level, opposition has 
                                               
48 Directive 2011/36 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2002/629/JHA [2011] OJ L101/1,  Recitals 8, 9, i.e. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2000 United Nations Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime, the 1930 ILO Convention No. 29, concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, i.e. Geneva Convention and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.  
49 It is one of 3 Protocols supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime adopted by UN GA Resolution 55/25 of 15 
November 2000 (UN Doc A/Res/55/25 (2000). 
50 S. Krieg, “Trafficking in Human Beings: The EU Approach between Border Control, Law Enforcement and Human Rights” (2009) 15 E.L.J. 775. 
51 See fn. 40. See former Title XX EC (development) cooperation) and Tittle IV EC (immigration policy); see V. Mitsilegas, “The Coherence of the 
Adopted Measures by the EU with regard to Organised Crime, namely the Fight against Human Trafficking and the UN Convention on Organised 
Crime – the Palermo Convention 6 and its 3 Protocols”, in D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala (eds), Controlling Security (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008), 65. 
52 Krieg, above fn. 50, 790; see Report of the European Expert Group on Trafficking in Human Beings (2004). 
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long-existed between a rights-based and law enforcement approach.  
 
The new Directive was the culmination of more than a decade of developing a European Union 
strategy to combat illegal migration.53 It is notably perceived as an innovative instrument because 
of its character as a criminal law rather than migration law instrument.54 The Directive also 
contains provisions which are largely similar to the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings and thus provides a concrete study of manifold norm 
cascades at several levels (UN, Council of Europe), beginning in the EU treaties and culminating 
in the Directive as a clear process of socialisation.55 The Directive repealed the heavily criticised 
2002 Council Framework Decision of 17 July 2002 on combatting trafficking in human beings 
2002/629/JHA.56 By the end of its transposition deadline in 2013 only 6 of the 27 Member States 
had transposed the Directive.57 It demonstrated the challenges of developing uniform norms in 
the AFSJ prior to the Commission obtaining powers to pursue infringement actions against the 
Member States in the area of the AFSJ prior to the expiry of the Protocol No. 36 on the transitional 
provisions.  
 
As Chaudry states, the Directive moves away from a previous approach in EU law of 
subordinating protection measures to investigating and prosecuting human traffickers for acts 
already committed.58 The new Directive adopts measures to support the principle of non-
punishment of victims and the prevention of further secondary victimisation. The Directive is 
perceived as making very explicit and specific use of the Trafficking Convention (e.g. in recital 
9) in providing a ‘solid’ legal base upon which to successfully advance a trafficking case.59 
However, some have argued that the Directive was considerably watered down in the end so as 
to allow national preferences to be exercised.60 It has also been argued that the Directive lent 
itself towards implementing security maintenance rather than victim protection and 
rehabilitation.61 An even more holistic approach is still anticipated by the European Union 
institutions, through the development of the controversial concept of ‘circular migration.’62  
 
                                               
53 See M-H. Chou, “The European Union and the fight against human trafficking: Comprehensive or Contradicting” (2008) 4(1) Stair 76; S. 
Chaudary, “Trafficking in Europe: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of European Law”(2011) 33 Mich. J. Int'l L. 77; See S. Peers “Immigration and 
Asylum law” in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) Ch. 26. 
54 E.g. “Trafficking victims too often treated as immigration cases, say campaigners” The Guardian (October 31, 2013). 
55 The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings CETS No. 197 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/trafficking/Flags-sos_en.asp [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
56 As Krieg states, the Framework Decision did not take an explicit stand on whom or what was responsible for the problem in human trafficking 
and for whose benefit the instrument was established: above, fn. 50, 776.   
57 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-322_en.htm [Accessed August 17, 2015].  
58 See Chaudary, above fn. 53, 98-99. 
59 Chaudary, fn. 53, 99.  
60 See Chou, fn. 53, 79. 
61 Chou, fn. 53, 76.  
62 See the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016 COM(2012) 286 final; Mid-term report on the 
implementation of the EU strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings SWD(2014) 318 final; On circular migration, see Chou, 
above fn. 53, 86-90; The UNHCR has regarded EU primary law on human trafficking to be highly progressive: e.g. as to references to in the EU 
Charter to trafficking (in art 5(3): UNHCR Comments on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing 
and combatting trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims COM(2010)95. 
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The Directive demonstrates the primacy of external norms as a rule-making principle in the AFSJ 
for some time. Nevertheless, the robustness of the norms themselves appears open to some 
reflection as does the margin for their individual Europeanisation.63 The extent to which a major 
change in thinking is evident from the use of external norms is difficult to assert here, where 
external norms had a longer pedigree within EU law rule-making processes but also were not 
necessarily ‘robust’. Instead, arguably external norms do not contribute here to a positive rule-
making tale. 
 
The next section analyses the impact of the first AFSJ Directive struck down by the Court post-
Lisbon for the place of external norms and its relationship to the EU’s role in the global legal 
order. It is an example of the weak use of external norms. 
 
(ii) The first AFSJ Directive post-Lisbon struck down by the Court 
A European Road Safety Area is a strategy of the new European Commission for 2011 to 2020 
which aims to cut road traffic accidents by 50% and develop the concept of a European Road 
Safety Area.64 It forms part of the EU’s effort to closely participate and align its policies with the 
UN Decade of Action on Road Safety 2011-2020.65 Directive 2011/82/EU is a related new 
directive of the last legislative cycle, motivated by a desire to facilitate cross-border exchange of 
information on road safety related traffic offences represented a desire on the part of the 
European Union to develop common standards.66 The Directive had as its specific goal the 
financial punishment of non-resident drivers, supported by considerable national data, practice 
and longitudinal European Union monitoring. The Directive purported to take into account 
international cooperation in the area of road safety, specifically the Vienna Convention on Road 
Traffic of 8 November 1968.67  It had been advocated by the European Transport Safety Council 
as a means to prevent multiple bilateral regimes and also to raise international road safety 
standards.68 Road safety is an area where homogenous practice and standardisation may have 
a significant impact. While 23 Member States are parties to the Vienna Convention but not the 
European Union, EU Member States with significant global car manufacturers have been 
prominent recently in proposing an amendment to the Vienna Convention in 2014 for 
‘autonomous’ cars (i.e. driverless cars).69 The Directive as an AFSJ measure was subject to an 
opt-out from the UK, Ireland and Denmark which was perceived as a blow to a homogenous and 
coherent development of EU policy internally but also possibly externally.  
                                               
63 Roos and Zaun, above, fn. 47. 
64 See Communication Towards a European road safety area: Policy orientations on Road Safety 2011-2020 COM(2010) 389 final.  
65 UN Decade of Action 2011-2020: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 10 April 2014, 68/269 ‘Improving global road 
safety’. 
66 Directive 2011/82/EU of 25 October 2011 facilitating the cross-border exchange of information on road safety related traffic offences [2011] 
OJ L288/ 1.  
67 See recital 15. 
68 See http://etsc.eu/faq-eu-cross-border-enforcement-directive/ [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
69 See Report of the 68th session on 68th Working Party Session Road Traffic Safety (March 24-26, 2014) 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2014/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-145e.pdf [Accessed August 17, 2015]. See International 
Encyclopaedia for Transport Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2015)  
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In 2014, the directive was struck down by the Court of Justice for reasons of its legal base. As 
the first post-Lisbon criminal law directive to be struck down by the Court, it warrants attention.70 
The Directive had been proposed by the Commission on the basis of what is now art. 91 (1)(c) 
TFEU, permitting measures to be enacted for the purposes of improving transport safety. 
However, it was adopted by the Parliament and Council in 2011 on the basis of art. 87(2) TFEU, 
the latter pertaining to police cooperation as to the prevention, detection and investigation of 
criminal offences. The Commission argued in proceedings initiated shortly after its adoption that 
the link to a criminal offence could not merely be inferred, an argument which the Court upheld. 
It held that a higher and more particularised standard was required to invoke Art. 87(2) TFEU, 
namely that the measure be ‘directly linked’ to the objectives of art. 87(2) TFEU in order to be 
used.71 Notably, Advocate General Bot had decided the matter differently, who found the 
formalist reading by the Commission of the boundaries of art. 87 TFEU to be unworkable and 
contrary to the wording of the article, which emphasised cooperation between all relevant 
authorities.72 The Directive was swiftly amended to change the legal base. The amendment had 
the effect that provisions as to opt outs for the UK, Ireland and Denmark became unnecessary.73 
 
The decision is remark-worthy in so far as the Court of Justice is conventionally perceived as 
‘light-touch’ in the domain of reviewing legal competence, especially as to criminal law 
measures.74 The Directive was perceived by some as a highly ‘expansionist’ piece of legislation. 
75 The decision has also been argued to be notable for how readily the Commission wished to 
litigate the use of legal competence.76 One may note how external norms have ostensibly no 
bearing either upon the reasoning of the Court or the Advocate General. Nevertheless, the 
change of legal base so as to obviate the need for opt-outs in fact renders multiple bilateral 
regimes less likely and thus has a possibly positive impact upon the effectiveness of the 
European Union in the international domain. It is prima facie a ‘weaker’ example of the place of 
external norms in the AFSJ on one level:- i.e. there is limited norm cascade. However, it is also 
a useful example of how internal competence may readily facilitate socialisation on the part of 
the European Union, i.e. stronger engagement with external norms.  
 
(iii) A Directive centrally employing a norm common to EU internal and external AFSJ 
rule-making 
A recent AFSJ directive in the area of cybercrime is worthy of consideration as to the place of 
                                               
70 Commission v. Parliament (43/12), May 6, 2014. 
71 Above, at para. 49. 
72 Opinion of the Advocate General, September 10, 2013, para. 56. 
73 In recitals 22 and 23 of the original directive: see fn. 66. See the revised directive: COM(2014) 476 final. 
74 Prior to its explicit introduction as a legal competence after the Treaty of Lisbon in art. 82 and 3 TFEU. See R. Schütze, “Lisbon and the Federal 
Order of Competences: A Prospective Analysis” (2008) 33 E.L.R. 709; G. Corstens “Criminal Justice in the post-Lisbon era” (2011-2012) 13(1) 
C.Y.E.L.S. 23.  
75 See V. Mitsilegas, “EU Criminal Law Competence After Lisbon: From Securitised to Functional Criminalisation” in D. Acosta and C. Murphy 
(eds), EU Security and Justice Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 110 at p. 126, n. 65.   
76 Above, fn. 75.  
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one specific external norm there. The reduction of cybercrime has been prioritised as a future 
regulatory goal for the EU in the AFSJ.77 It has also had a significant place in recent AFSJ rule-
making of the last legislative cycle. The substantive legal content of EU cybercrime law has 
evolved in a piecemeal form beginning with the Framework Decision on attacks against 
information systems in 2005 and so it is not an entirely new phenomenon per se.78 A 
comprehensive legal definition of ‘cybercrime’ for EU law is not yet found in secondary law. 
Instead, the content of the Council of Europe Convention on cybercrime forms the basis for 
recent EU law in this area for some time,79 as well as externally for rule-making with the US.80 In 
this regard, the EU along with the US seeks to have most countries in the world ratify the 
Convention as one of the objects of the EU-US Working Group on Cybercrime and Cyber 
Security (EU-US WGCC).81 However, the Convention is far from an optimal norm. It is criticised 
for its overbroad content, for excessively reflecting law enforcement standards, for its inadequate 
provisions on data protection and for its lack of provision for cross-border enforcement.82 A draft 
additional Protocol to provide transborder access to data has proved to be contentious and is 
trenchantly opposed on civil liberties grounds by, for example, the European Parliament.83 Full 
Member State ratification of the Convention is almost complete but considerably behind the EU-
US WGCC goals for 2015, which otherwise has evolved considerably as a rule-making project.84 
 
Drawing significantly from the Convention, the Directive on attacks against information systems 
adopted in 2013 places emphasis upon fighting large scale ‘botnets’ i.e. networks of computers 
with a cross-border dimension.85 An earlier version of the Cybercrime Directive had been 
criticised for its vague legal obligations and its over-criminalisation of ‘small-scale’ hackers.86 The 
Directive promotes significantly the Convention in its recitals as part of the EU’s strategic 
direction.87 It purports to criminalise access to systems, systems interferences and data 
interference, with penalties from two to five years. Pursuant to art. 12, a Member State must 
inform the Commission where it wishes to take jurisdiction over offences outside its territory, a 
                                               
77 Operational Action Plans 2015 related to the EU's priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime between 2014 and 2017, Council 
doc. 15929/2/14 Rev 2. 
78 Council Framework Decision 2005/22/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, [2005] OJ L69/67. 
79 European Treaty Series (ETS), No 185, Budapest, September 23, 2001. 
80  European Commission, ‘Cyber-security Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’ JOIN(2013)1final, at 9; Council 
of the European Union, ‘EU-US Summit, Joint Statement’, Council doc. 16726/10, 3, which set up the EU-US Working Group on Cybercrime and 
Cyber Security, Concept Paper, April 13, 2011. See E. Fahey, “European Union’s Cybercrime and Cyber Security Rule-Making: Mapping the 
Internal and External Dimensions of European Union Security” (2014) 1 Eur. J. Risk Reg. 46, as to the place of this external norm in EU rule-
making for some time. 
81 Concept Paper, above fn. 80, 4. It is thus a temporally ‘recent’ objective in European Union external action. 
82 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Statement on Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Treaty 108-111, (July 26, 2013), 
https://epic.org/privacy/intl/ccc.html; Ian Brown ‘The feasibility of transatlantic privacy protective standards for surveillance’ (2014) 1 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 1, Section 3.3; However, see its prominent place in the post-NSA affair negotiations: 
Council of the European Union, ‘Report on the Findings by the EU Co-chairs of the Ad Hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection’ Council 
doc. 16987/13; European Commission, ‘Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows’ COM(2013) 846 final, 9. 
83It purports to relax constraints on the requesting 
Party, now bound by the computer system location “in its territory”. Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) (Draft) elements of an Additional 
Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime regarding transborder access to data T-CY (2013)14; www.coe.int/TCY. See Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2013/2188(INI) on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States 
and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. 
84 See ratification table, fn. 40. See Fahey, fn. 80 further on the post-NSA developments 
85 See Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA 2013, [2013] OJ  L218/8, recital 15. 
86 See European Parliament, LIBE briefing, June 2012 2010/0273; Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor of June 14, 2013 on the 
Cyber Security Strategy and Directive <https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/Consultation/OpinionsC [Accessed August 17, 2015].  
87 See Recital 15. 
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provision that appears likely to give rise to future litigation. More generally, an EU ‘Cybercrime 
Centre’ (the so-called ‘EC3’) was also launched in 2013 and so effectuates the institutionalization 
of cybercrime policy.88 It further demonstrates the form of socialisation taking place. 
 
The place of the Cybercrime Convention here is significant for its centrality to internal and 
external rule-making process, despite its shortcomings and provide concrete evidence of a dual-
faceted norm cascade. While the EU gives primacy to external norms in both its current internal 
and external rule-making, it appears to produce very different regulatory results.89 In this way, 
the lead place of an external norm even if not so robust appears distinctive in comparison with 
others considered in this account. 
 
The place of specific UN Conventions in AFSJ directives is considered next, as norms of some 
historic significance. 
 
(iv) UN Conventions in AFSJ directives 
United Nations (UN) Conventions constitute the most cited external norm in recent AFSJ 
Directives and warrant consideration as a result. Despite the wording of Art. 21 TEU mandating 
the European Union the entitlement to participate in the global legal order, in general, the external 
environment is perceived to be less hospitable to the EU’s ambitions in international relations.90 
The adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 65/276 on 3 May 2011 purported to implement 
the Treaty of Lisbon provisions at the United Nations so as to afford the EU enhanced 
participation rights.91  The European Union enjoys a varied range of statuses in UN bodies, 
statuses that generally appear ‘privileged’ compared to its place in other international 
organisations.92 As a result, the evolution of its place within the UN system is perceived to be a 
constant battle between formalism and flexibility. The European Union has obtained a 
hotchpotch of victories:- it has obtained observer status in most fora, been given enhanced 
participation rights in some and only granted status as a member organisation in a few 
exceptional cases.93 More positively, some accounts outline the success of the EU in exporting 
its governance to UN Conventions, for example, the negotiations of UN Convention on 
Disabilities.94 This context, however, does not necessarily give any indicator as to how UN 
Conventions operate in the internal legal context, for example, in AFSJ Directives and thus 
                                               
88See European Commission, ‘Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre’ COM(2012).  
89 See Fahey, above fn. 80. 
90 See G. De Baere and E. Passivirta, “Identity and Difference: The EU and the UN as Part of Each Other” in H. de Waele and J.J. Kuijper (eds) The 
Emergence of the European Union’s International Identity – Views from the Global Arena (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 21-42, 26. 
91 Giving effect to the aspirations in Art. 21 TFEU. 
92 F. Hoffmeister, “Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and European Law on the Status of the European Union 
in International Organizations and Treaty Bodies” (2007) C.M.L.R. 41. 
93 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the only example of a UN specialized agency in which the EU holds membership status As 
Wouters et al observe, the EU struggles for more effective participation in the UN framework in the face of stumbling blocks that are both 
internal and external and frequently illogical or not obvious. They give the example of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), as a UN specialized agency in a policy field of ‘weak’ EU powers but where the EU has nevertheless been granted an ‘ad 
hoc’ upgraded status for a specific purpose. Conversely, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a UN agency where the EU holds no 
status despite its prolific legislative and policy initiatives in maritime affairs: J. Wouters, A. Chané, J. Odermatt and T. Ramopoulos ‘The European 
Union: A Shadowy Global Actor? The UN System as an Example’ in E. Fahey (ed), The Actors of Postnational Rule-Making: Contemporary 
Challenges of European and International Law (Routledge, 2015). 
94 G. De Búrca, “The European Union in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention“ (2010) 35 E.L.R. 174.  
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warrants further reflection. Their use prima facie indicates their relevance as regards informing 
and also legitimising rule-making practice, de facto and de jure. UN Conventions are the most 
cited norms in AFSJ Directives as to migration and human protection. In these domains, the EU 
itself is only a signatory to a minority of UN Conventions arising in Directives unlike the Member 
States.  
 
At least five UN Conventions feature prominently in recent AFSJ Directives. Firstly, the UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of the Child forms the main external norm or source 
for maximum harmonisation in Directive 2011/92 on combating sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, which the European Union is not party to.95 The 
Convention is the most widely ratified of all human rights treaties and explicitly seeks full and 
direct incorporation so as to maximise its full legal effect.96 The European Union has the 
ratification of the Convention as a strategic agenda and places emphasis upon an internal and 
external interlinkage of policy.97 It adopts a maximum harmonisation approach in Directive 
2011/92, which deploys far-reaching criminal law penalties.98  It may be said to raise certain 
questions as to subsidiarity given its character because it differs significantly from minimum 
harmonisation more usually found in AFSJ directives. Here the UN Convention used has an 
important legitimising effect and is a clear example of the operation of external norm primacy.  
 
This same Convention is also deployed in Directive 2011/36 on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims,99 Directive 2013/32 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection,100 Directive 2013/33 laying 
down standards for the reception of applications for international protection101 and Directive 
2011/95 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection.102 Next, the Trafficking Directive discussed above also 
deploys the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as three other UN Conventions, 
namely, the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime and Protocols thereto, the UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.103 Finally, UN Convention on Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women is deployed in Directive 2012/29 establishing minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.104 This directive is part of the 
Road Map agenda on strengthening procedural rights,105 one of several victims and accused 
                                               
95 [2011] OJ L335/1,  recital 23. 
96 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
97 Communication on an EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child COM (2011) 60 final, Communication Towards an Strategy on the rights of the 
child (2006) COM 367 final. 
98 For example, it proscribes penalties for up to 5 years for sexual exploitation offences: art. 4(5). 
99 [2011] OJ L 101/1, recital 8. 
100 [2013] OJ L 180/60, recital 33. 
101 [2013] OJ L 180/96, recital 9. 
102 [2011] OJ L 337/9, recital 18. 
103 Recitals 8, 9 and 13. 
104 [2012] OJ L 315/57, recital 6. Women are referenced in recitals 5,6, 17 and 18.  
105 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions Strengthening victims’ rights in the European Union COM(2011) 274 final; Directive 2010/64 on the right to interpretation and 
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rights directives.106 These Directives are heavily grounded in the caselaw of the European Court 
on Human Rights, which arguably displaces the significance of the Convention deployed here. 
Gender-based concerns appear informative rather than operate in this particular Directive, which 
also gives prominence to child-centred approaches in its articles (e.g. art. 1). It demonstrates a 
significantly weaker place for external norms here, where rule-making encompasses less robust 
norms.  
 
In the case of UN Conventions, there is evidence of norm cascades taking place over a longer-
term period. Migration and human protection may be said to form areas where the European 
Union awkwardly juggles its attempts to holistically evolve its practices, to follow best practice 
and to act as an autonomous standard-setter. While less than robust norms facilitate its own 
development of autonomous norms, UN Conventions are deployed here largely with less impact 
or significance in comparison with others considered here. The process of socialisation of the 
EU within the UN does not appear to have a strong link to rule-making practice, certainly not 
within AFSJ Directives. 
 
The next section considers norm omission in AFSJ Directives in specific instruments. 
 
(v) Norm omission and AFSJ Directives 
In two AFSJ Directives of the last legislative cycle there are no references to external norms 
whatsoever. Firstly, striking is the omission of external norm promotion in the proposed 
Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive,107 a controversial AFSJ measure post-Lisbon, 
proposing surveillance of European Union citizen travel within the European Union which 
remains in stalemate in the European Union legislative process for several years. Notably, it 
references the infamous EU-US PNR Agreements and PNR agreements with other countries 
alone but not other external norms, for example, a relevant Council of Europe Convention.108 In 
fact in this instrument, these policies and their values are expressed with striking brevity. One 
might say here then that there may be a failure of transparency in European Union rule-making 
as to its provenance, through the emasculation of its legislative history. Similarly, as regards 
legislative omissions, one might expect legislation on common set of rights for third country 
workers to include a wide array of external norms and sources because of its distinctive origins 
                                               
translation in criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L280/1; Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L142/1; 
Directive 2011/99 on the European protection order [2011] OJ L338/2. 
106 See previously: Framework Decision 2001/220 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings [2001] OJ L82/1 and Directive 2004/80 
relating to compensation to crime victims [2004] OJ L261/15. For a broader setting of these measures pre-Lisbon, see E. Baker and C. Harding 
“From Past Imperfect to Future Perfect? A Longitudinal Study of the Third Pillar” (2009) E.L.R. 34, pp. 25-54. 
 
107 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime 2011/23(COD). The European Council called on the Council and Parliament 
to finalise work on the European Union PNR proposal: EUCO163/14, p.6. At the time of writing, it was awaiting Committee decision in the 
European Parliament. 
108 E.g. on the Protection of Terrorism, above, fn. 3. These EU-US Agreements have generated serious fundamental rights and data protection 
concerns: see further  E. Fahey, “Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: Rights, Redress, and Remedies in 
European Union-US Passenger Name Records and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program” (2013) 32 Ybk.Eur.Law 368. 
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in international law.109 However, the limited reference to external norms in such instruments 
appears then all the more striking.110 A failure to expound the normative influences upon 
European Union rules can be inferred to emphasise its originality controversial origins, its 
stringency in its original format, its challenges for judicial review or its failure to balance 
fundamental rights concerns appropriately.111 The work of the legislature as to PNR may rightfully 
generate concern, not least because of the strong objections of, for example, Fundamental 
Rights Agency or the Data Protection Supervisor to this particular instrument, yet appear 
eclipsed after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, which reignited a debate on the introduction of the 
Directive.112  
 
Remaining on the theme of ‘norm omission’, one of the most politically controversial measures 
of the recent legislative cycle worthy of mention is the European Investigative Order (EIO).113 
The EIO is a bold departure from traditional methods of evidence gathering, traditionally 
conducted through Mutual Legal Assistance. Even though this Directive operates ostensibly as 
a broad patchwork quilt of norms, the only norm referenced in its recitals therein is the Charter.114 
Strikingly, the Member States curtailed the European Commission’s proposals on evidence 
gathering in favour of their own instrument through enhanced cooperation. It has received 
extensive critique for its scope, for example, through its permission of the investigation of ‘any 
matter’ in art.  3, with little judicial control. It is perceived to embody the difficulties associated 
with the evolution of mutual recognition.115 Its controversy might be said to be evident through 
its establishment through enhanced cooperation, which in turn might be said to necessitate very 
explicit subsidiary and proportionality commitments. On the contrary, what may be observed 
therein is a common and prosaic recitation of subsidiarity.116 This might be said to be a good 
example of where external norms could have provided a useful legitimation template. Arguably, 
norm promotion should be particularly detailed in instruments of enhanced cooperation so as to 
                                               
109 See further on this Roos and Zaun, above fn. 47. 
110 For example, Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure 
for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-
country workers legally residing in a Member State ([2011] OJ L343/1) refers only to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (third country workers’ 
rights).  
111 See also limited number of external norms deployed in Directive 2011/98, listing only the Charter in its recitals (31) rather than any labour 
or migrant-related instrument.  
112 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights FRA Opinion – 1/2011 (14 June 2011); Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor 25 March 2011, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2011/11-
03-25_PNR_EN.pdf [Accessed August 17, 2015]; art.  29 Working Party on Data Protection Opinion 145 of 2007 (December 5, 2007). See 
Resolution of the European Parliament of 25 November 2014 seeking an opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility with the Treaties 
of the Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data (2014 /2966 (RSP)). 
113 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal 
matters OJ L130/1. See EUObserver, “New European Union police investigation co-operation alarms civil liberties watchdogs” 
http://euobserver.com/justice/30553 [Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
114 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 (and its two additional protocols); the Schengen 
Convention; the 2000 European Union Convention on Mutual assistance in criminal matters (and its Protocol); 2008 Framework Decision on the 
European evidence warrant; the 2003 Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence (as 
regards freezing of evidence). 
115 See D. Sayers, “The European Investigative Order: travelling without a roadmap” (2011) Centre for European Policy Studies; S. Peers “The 
proposed European Investigation Order: Assault on human rights and national sovereignty” Statewatch Analysis (May 2010), 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-96-european-investigation-order.pdf [Accessed August 17, 2015]; J. Blackstock, “The European 
Investigation Order” (2010) 1 New Journal of European Criminal Law 481. 
116I.e.: “Since the objective of this Directive, namely the mutual recognition of decisions taken to obtain evidence, cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in art.  5 of the TEU.” 
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gain legitimation, given their propensity to generate inter alia subsidiarity and proportionality 
concerns.117 Judicial practice in the post-Lisbon era appears to give less than subtle indications 
about the role of the legislator in this regard,118 and appears to create an impetus for more and 
better norm promotion. 
 
The next section considers the rationale of the place of external norms in AFSJ rule-making in 
a broader context. 
Section III: Assessing external norms in AFSJ rule-making: from form to rationale  
The link between external norms, European Union internal legislative practice and EU external 
relations is not explicit within EU law itself. The study here has thus purported to bring ‘daylight’ 
to this relationship of the ‘internal’ with the ‘external’. In this regard, it reveals many varying 
practices. First, external norms may have a long pedigree within EU law but may not necessarily 
be so robust, which in turn may water down their own significance. Secondly, the example of the 
Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention considered here in Section II(iii) indicates prominence 
in rule-making for an external norm. Despite its shortcomings, in this instance, it is one which 
contributes greatly towards socialisation. Thirdly, internal competence may be of tremendous 
significance to the future engagement of the European Union with external norms as the 
casestudy here on the Road Traffic Directive demonstrates. Fourthly, practice indicates shorter 
and long-term term differences as to influence or impact of an external norm. For example, UN 
Conventions feature prominently as to migration and human protection for reasons of legitimacy 
and norm primacy that suggest longer-term socialisation. However, external norms may not be 
very robust yet may still impact upon de facto and de jure ‘legitimisation’ of practice. Fifthly, the 
absence of external norms is also revealing of legislative practice in the recent AFSJ era. Such 
instances demonstrate the limited norm cascade that can be expected to occur when norms are 
simply not robust enough or permit significant local change. The study of socialisation in this 
instance is arguably complicated or hindered by a lack of transparency on the part of the 
legislator. 
 
After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union Commission Treaties Office 
sought to systematise transparently all European Union agreements with a bilateral or 
multilateral dimension, by categorising the use by the European Union of human rights, evolution 
and territorial clauses.119 In doing so, it sought to bring transparency to the European Union’s 
external reach through law. Such categorisations, however imperfect, constitute useful tools so 
as to understand the nature of European Union rule-making practices. While there is much merit 
to such ‘transparency’ in its broadest sense, it appears more inspired by aesthetic transparency 
                                               
117 And more recently, their propensity to be litigated: Spain and Italy v Council (Unitary patent) (C-274/11 and C–295/11) [2013] E.C.R. I-000; 
United Kingdom v. Council (C-209/13), June 6, 2014 (Financial Transaction Tax). See the 2013 Report on the application of the European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights from the European Commission, which is remarkably brief: COM(2014) 224 final. 
118 For example, in Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (Case C-293/12)  April 8, 2014. 
119 Treaties Office, Database of the European External Action Service. http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/viewCollection.do?fileID=67962 
[Accessed August 17, 2015]. 
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rather than more substantive openness.120 Efforts on the part of the European Union to 
systematise the European Union’s integration of internal and external norms may appear more 
cosmetic or aesthetic than substantive. The advent of Directives in the AFSJ surely raises 
manifold issues of discretion and even sovereignty. The provenance and objectives of Directives 
arguably requires more careful formulation in an era where norm specificity and transparency 
have become more essential as AFSJ rule-making begins to fall within more mainstream rule-
making practices. 
 
Returning to the three criteria outlined in Section I as to framing socialisation in rule-making 
(participation, robustness and temporal questions), the criteria may be said to be instructive. EU 
law appears to be extremely open to the integration of external norms as a process of 
socialisation of the European Union in the global legal order, irrespective of its own status in 
international organisations or participation. Practice sometimes even indicates the primacy of 
external norms in AFSJ rule-making as a legal standard but this is not wholly dispositive of their 
place. There is an inherent openness in rule-making to use external norms as a reason to set 
high standards, but this is not always the case. External norms may paradoxically enable a de 
facto and de jure ‘reduction’ of standards in EU law if not robust enough. For example, definitional 
standards, implementation and enforcement at local level may veer far away from the goals of 
the external norm if the latter is not robust enough. The temporal context of the influence of 
external norms reveals the evolution of the place of an external norm but is not dispositive alone 
as a criterion and demonstrates the necessity for holistic study of rule-making practices.  
 
 
Conclusions 
This study has sought to demonstrate that there is no mechanism or means to systematically or 
formally link external norms in AFSJ Directives with the role of the European Union in the global 
legal order.  As a result, tracing the promotion of norms in AFSJ rule-making offers specific and 
even holistic insights into the contemporary legislative process. It also offers insights into the 
evolving relationship between the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ in the AFSJ as a broader process of 
socialisation of the European Union in the global legal order. It is one which has been argued 
here to warrant further transparency. The study of AFSJ Directives suggests that the use of 
external norms is in effect an internalisation of those norms but in a variety of ways. The 
perceived robustness of norms, participation and temporal questions are important factors in 
joining the dots between the internal and external. While norm cascades vary greatly within AFSJ 
Directives as they evolve, it is a study which provides clear evidence of the autonomous 
development of norms in the AFSJ. The account here thus demonstrates the usefulness of 
scrutinising internal and external practice and interrelating them. 
                                               
120 And it is notably not maintained or updated at the time of writing for the vast majority of Agreements considered here in Section 1. 
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